COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION

Investigation Regarding Rate Issues
Related to Disbursements from
Pennsylvania Universal Service Fund,
Investigation for consideration of
whether there should be further
intrastate access charge reductions
and intraLATA toll rate reductions in
the service territories of rural
incumbent local exchange carriers and
all rate changes that should or would
result in the event that disbursements:
from the Pennsylvania Universal
Service Fund are reduced.

Docket No. I-00040105

(Further In-Person Pre-Hearing Conference)

Pages 16 through 91

Hearing Room 1 Commonwealth Keystone Building Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

Thursday, April 21, 2005

Met, pursuant to notice, at 1:00 p.m.

BEFORE:

SUSAN D. COLWELL, Administrative Law Judge

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WITNESS INDEX

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PROCEEDINGS

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE SUSAN D. COLWELL:

It is Thursday, April 21st, 2005. This is the time and the place set for the second pre-hearing conference in the Investigation Regarding Intrastate Access Charges and InterLATA Toll Rates of Rural Carriers in the Pennsylvania Universal Service Fund at PUC docket I-00040105.

I note for the record the attendance of the following counsel: Zsuzsanna Benedek for United Telephone Company of Pa., doing business as Sprint; Phil McClelland and Joel Cheskis for the Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate; Mark Stewart for AT&T; John Povilaitis for Quest; Christopher Arfaa for Cellco Partnership, doing business as Verizon Wireless; Thomas Sniscak for Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc., and Verizon North, Inc.; Michelle Painter for MCI; Patricia Armstrong and Gina Matz for the Rural Telephone Company Coalition; Bradford Stern for Nextel and T-Mobile; Robert Eckenrod for the Office of Trial Staff; and Steven Gray for the Office of Small Business Advocate.

Did I miss anyone?

(No response.)

JUDGE COLWELL: We also have on the phone Kristin Smith for Quest. She will not be participating, but she will be listening in.

You're there, right, Ms. Smith?

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MS. SMITH: Yes, I am.

JUDGE COLWELL: Just checking. I didn't want to lose you.

I note that I received an entry of appearance from Mr. Sniscak and that he asked that service should continue to be made on Susan Paiva at Verizon. He's just here today.

This is our second pre-hearing conference.

This time we have lots of pre-hearing memos to discuss; but, before we even get to them, I was served with a motion of the wireless carriers for a determination that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to require CMRS providers to contribute to the funding of the Pennsylvania Universal Service Fund and for bifurcation or certification for immediate Commission review. So why don't we deal with that first.

As you can see, we have this beautiful little podium set up so that one at a time you can come up and tell me your stories. So why don't we start with Mr. Arfaa.

MR. ARFAA: Thank you, Your Honor. Good afternoon.

JUDGE COLWELL: Good afternoon.

MR. ARFAA: Chris Arfaa for Verizon Wireless today in support of the motion. It's a fairly straightforward motion with two requests for relief as you

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noted. There is the request for the declaration that the law does not permit the PUC at this time to require wireless carriers to contribute to a Universal Service Fund at the state level. There is also a request for expedited final determination of that issue.

Reviewing the responses that we received, I just want to note that no one seems opposed to the second request, the one for expedited determination; and, in fact, even Sprint United has come out in favor of it. Also, with very little opposition was the agreement among all parties that the PUC under today's statutes and the state Public Utility Code does not have authority to regulate commercial and mobile radio service, CMRS, providers.

So you might wonder what is the read of the briefs -- but one might wonder what the actual dispute is.

Principally, the Rural Carrier Coalition has posited several alternative theories as to how this Commission somehow does have authority. Despite the plain words of the statute, the regulated wireless carriers require contribution to the Pennsylvania Universal Service Fund, and those three basically follow a policy basis which is shared by AT&T and also the Office of Small Business Advocate, the state law basis and the federal basis.

On the policy basis, I think we can all agree that the matters -- policy matters -- whether a policy

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matter is conferred to the authority of this Commission is determined by the legislature, and the Supreme Court was very clear about that in the Bethlehem Steel case. There was some concern there that a private utility so to speak was acting in a very public utility kind of way and that this would somehow upset a scheme that was conferred to the PUC's authority. The Supreme Court said that may be true, but that concerns the legislature; and I would say same here.

There may be valid reasons to include wireless carriers among the class of contributing carriers. We give no reasons not to based on the characteristics of our industry of what we are already doing in the state. However, that debate is for the legislature because, as we have also outlined in our submission, the power of the PUC is only that expressly given to them and clearly required by the legislature and necessary power to implement those mandates.

JUDGE COLWELL: But don't you think the Commission has the responsibility for letting the legislature know it doesn't have what it needs to do its job?

MR. ARFAA: Absolutely, Your Honor. And that's why, I think, that the determination today or pursuant to this motion that PUC does not -- the order that

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we request recognizing that we believe under the law that
the PUC today does not have the power to include CMRS

providers among the class of contributors would fulfill that
precise responsibility. You'd be telling the legislature we
don't have this power.

JUDGE COLWELL: But how are we going to tell them that we think we need it if we can't back it up with anything because you've gotten out of this proceeding before you've given any information?

MR. ARFAA: I don't think that we will necessarily be out of this proceeding completely. We would certainly -- if you were -- this is a hypothetical -- if you and the Commission were to decide that, yes, the wireless carriers may not be included in this Fund today; however, the scope of this information does include your investigatory power and exploration, if you will, of whether carriers should be included, that certainly is something we think our clients would want to participate in and would feel it important to give the Commission information.

JUDGE COLWELL: It seems to me that's what the wording of the question is. It doesn't say determine whether or not the Commission has the jurisdiction. It says whether or not the carriers should be included.

MR. ARFAA: Yes, Your Honor, but whether they should or not are two different kinds of -- there's really

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two questions. One is, should the next Fund include these
carriers; and I submit that, when the law does not permit
the Commission to do so, it should not. The question, then,
is not whether the carriers should be included, but should
the law be amended so that the Commission may include them.
It's a slightly different question. I don't mean to split
hairs.

But, for us, what's the difference? The difference is this. All the submissions in this proceeding as to the size of the Fund, the need for funding, the kind of revenues included, the various competitive aspects among the carriers, and the rates that being compared are all going to be influenced by which carriers are the ones that have to contribute and participate. And so it's a fundamental question -- many of the other questions that are before you, and we feel that it's important.

My point is this, though. We still think it's a prior question as to whether -- do all the other questions of whether the Fund should exist, what size it should be, what considerations should go into its structure, how various competitive state charges should be reconciled so what carriers or competitors are building up a competing facility. All of those things depends in large part on who participates, who's in the game, who is subject to PUC regulation. So we think that, not only is it in order to

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answer the Commission's question should wireless carriers be included, you have to decide whether the Commission may because it should not do anything that it does not have the power to do as a matter of law.

But, also, as a practical matter, all of the questions that are before you, we submit the decision of the question of who's in and who's out today really will form a lot of the portion of this proceeding; and I can say on behalf of my client certainly it will affect our submission in this proceeding. And I think that's the case with the other carriers as well.

JUDGE COLWELL: I understand what you're saying, but I'm still having trouble getting past the problem of giving the Commission a well-reasoned and thorough analysis without you being here to give me the information that they require in that question.

MR. ARFAA: Your Honor, I don't understand our motion to say that -- to ask you to dismiss us from the case.

JUDGE COLWELL: Well, then, what do you see as the result of it being?

MR. ARFAA: There ultimately is going to be a certainty so that we can be rest assured that, at the end of this proceeding, we will not be presented a bill by the Public Utility Commission or its designee for a contribution

to the Fund.

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JUDGE COLWELL: So, if in fact the motion is granted, you will stay in here and give us information on this section?

MR. ARFAA: That's a -- I have not reviewed
that with my client. That's a good question. I would
imagine speaking -- that caveat that one or more of the
carriers who would continue participating and be responsive
to -- would reserve the right to resist or to object to data
requests by the public staff or discovery requests by others
that would be inappropriate and intrusive. Subject to
check, if I may, I believe that the carriers will continue
to participate before the Commission as part of their
responsibility.

If I may, to move on to the -- if it's appropriate, if I answered your question.

JUDGE COLWELL: Go ahead.

MR. ARFAA: I just wanted just to answer a few points in the Rural Carrier Coalition's memo. A lot of argument is there is something — this doesn't prohibit the Commission from doing it. That doesn't prohibit the Commission from doing it. What we have to remember, of course, is that it's not an absence or prohibition here. It's an express grant of authority or, with one slight qualification which I'll get to.

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All the courts -- every court in this state that has construed one or section 2 IV of the public utility definition with the exception of Public Utility Commission ||in the Code which accepts mobile radio service providers -agrees that it completely invests the Commission of jurisdiction. We are not a public utility. The Commission itself has agreed.

Now, the rural carriers point out that, in the Commonwealth Court decision dealing with Global Bell Atlantic decision, the Commonwealth Court there said, well, wait a minute -- the Bell Atlantic argued that there was no 12 express authority to build the Fund, an argument similar to but not all the same here today. And the Commonwealth Court said, no, but there's a policy and there's a residual grant of authority in both 501 and also in recently replaced 3009 to do all things necessary to protect the consumer and to carry out responsibilities.

But both of those provisions 501, as to public utilities, and today 3019 of the Code, which was cited by the rural carriers as providing the authority. relate to regulation in 501 of public utilities -- and we know there there's an exception still for wireless carriers -- and 3019 to telecommunications carriers. The Commission retains the authority with respect to telecommunications carriers and interexchange carriers.

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Telecommunications carriers is defined by the new Chapter 30 in Section 3012 -- and actually I have the statute here if you like to look. I'd also like to say I have a few more. I'll refer to the handwritten page numbers 5 ||in the lower right-hand corner. If you look at page 13, the ||Section 3019B.3, that is what we're referring to. If you look at B, it says, powers and duties retained -- and this is the legislation that was adopted, at least as of last December -- the Commission shall retain -- no parenthetical 10 ||but the Commonwealth Court interpreted language like that as bolstering the creation of the Fund originally -- the 12 ||Commission shall retain the following powers relating to the 13 | regulation of all telecommunications carriers, etc.

And then under E, subject to the provisions of 3015E, etc., to establish such additional requirements as are consistent with this chapter as the Commission determines to be necessary to insure the protection of customers.

Now, the PUC and the Commonwealth Court cited similar language in the Bell Atlantic case supporting the power to create a fund. And the rural carriers today also cite this as supporting the authority to create a fund. \parallel However, if you look at the definition of telecommunications carrier, which is set forth on handwritten page number 12 -which again was enacted in December along with the provision

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I ||I just read -- it defines telecommunications carrier as an entity that provides telecommunications services subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.

As we know in telecommunications carriers --5 CMRS providers are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. So this legislation does nothing. assuming arguendo for the sake of this argument, that this provides the ability to create a Universal Service Fund in general, it does not do so with respect to CMRS providers in terms of forcing them to participate. The state law basis on which the RCC relies, in my opinion I submit, does not support their argument

Now, finally, they cite Section 254F of the Telecommunications Act, which, of course, is the state Universal Service provision; and they raise several arguments. That provision, of course, states first that states not state commissions -- they're defined separately in the Code -- pardon me, in the Act -- states may enact regulations to promote Universal Service on a state basis.

This is not a grant of authority to this Commission; and I would submit that this Commission is a creature of state law, and the federal government can't by itself create authority that it does not have pursuant to the statute in Pennsylvania. And nothing in the statute grants the PUC authority. Furthermore, there is a

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suggestion in the -- there's, pardon me -- it is clearly permissible -- so it's may not that states must do this -lit clearly relates to states.

Now, the rural carriers again say, in 5 Pennsylvania, the legislature has delegated this authority granted by 254F through the statutes we just discussed, 501 and 3019. But, first of all, one, there is no authority delegated. It just says may. It's a clear statement that they're not preempted. And, two, as we've just seen, those statutes do not delegate authority with respect to 11 |non-jurisdictional utilities.

There's also -- and this is my last point --13 there is also a mention in the rural carriers' brief of 14 ||preemption saying, well, it would be inconsistent with the 15 | federal scheme not to include all telecommunications 16 | carriers providing services. It would be inconsistent with that scheme to exclude them; and, therefore, you must construe the state law as consistent with the scheme because a contrary construction would be preemptive.

Your Honor, that argument doesn't work for the following reasons. First of all, preemption is the taking away of authority not the granting of authority. What we need to find here in order to give the Commission the authority to force us to contribute is a grant authority.

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Second, both the Commonwealth Court and the federal authority cited in that Bell Atlantic decision recognized that the federal law makes it optional for states to create a Universal Service Fund at all and also to include wireless carriers. So, while state and federal authority recognizes whether or not the wireless carriers may be permissible under 254F -- or it is, actually, it is an option. Furthermore, it's already been proved too much.

If a state Universal Service Fund does not include wireless carriers as preempted, then Pennsylvania has had authority -- if not preempted -- illegal Universal Service Fund in violation of federal law since the year 2000 under the current Fund, of course, which wireless are not included in the current Fund.

JUDGE COLWELL: Are you asking me to address that question, whether or not we have the authority to even have the USF that exists?

MR. ARFAA: That is not before you today. I think that is a question that is very much part of this proceeding. When we address the pre-hearing memoranda and the issues that are being addressed by Mr. Stern, I think he's going to have some more to say about that. If you feel that's important for your decision and if you feel, like we do, that the authority is also lacking, I certainly would have no objection to that determination being included in

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the determination of this motion.

I also say that -- Ms. Armstrong will correct 3 me if I'm wrong -- I believe that the Universal Service Fund plan to which the rural carriers subscribed in the Global proceeding which was then litigated in the Commonwealth Court excluded wireless carriers; is that right?

MS. ARMSTRONG: The rates speak for themselves. They do not include wireless carriers.

MR. ARFAA: It is rather odd for the rural carriers today, having reaped the benefits of that plan which was approved on the basis by the Commonwealth Court to 12 ||exclude wireless carriers, to all of a sudden say, no, that 13 ||plan was illegal. It's preempted. You can't have that kind of plan. It doesn't include wireless carriers, which, if you take their preemption argument today, it leads to the logical conclusion that no plan can be legal under 254F unless it includes all carriers. Then they have been reaping the benefits of an illegal plan for the last five years.

And I think, frankly, they're estopped from making that argument having received the benefits of the scheme that they're objecting to today.

If you have no further questions --JUDGE COLWELL: Well, just one more. statement said that not including wireless carriers creates

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competitive concerns and that the Commission should seek the authority if it doesn't have it now. How do you respond to that?

MR. ARFAA: Your Honor, that is a legitimate 5 |question. Every carrier competes in this state. AT&T had no problem having regulation of the local exchange carriers

JUDGE COLWELL: I don't want you to attack the individual. I want you to address the issue.

MR. ARFAA: Pardon me. I'll give you an example. The interexchange carriers are regulated 12 ||differently from the local carriers. Local carriers are 13 ||regulated different from CLECs to an extent. They're all regulated differently from wireless.

Wireless carriers are built on a completely different paradigm of regulation based on competition and 17 | hands-off regulation uniformly nationally, and a whole host of competing concerns at the federal level to which local carriers historically have not been subject. So there's a whole bunch of, yes, it is a question; but I would submit to you there is a whole host of competitive considerations and policy considerations at the federal level as well as the state that would change the answer that AT&T seems to infer when they ask that question.

Once again, that is a legislative question,

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and under our scheme of government here in Pennsylvania as the Supreme Court recognized, is one of the legislature not the PUC to decide.

JUDGE COLWELL: Well, doesn't that go right back to the beginning because the legislature doesn't work in a vacuum? It addresses problems as they're brought to their attention. Somebody is responsible for bringing -- probably for lack of a better word -- to their attention. The state agencies are excepted to do that.

MR. ARFAA: Your Honor, I understand exactly what you're saying and what you're asking, and let me respond this way. The motion before you is not for withdrawal or dismissal or any kind of termination of these proceedings. It's a request for a interlocutory determination of an important question. It will not, by your granting the relief requested in the motion, you will not be cutting the Commission off from any of that information that you're referring to.

JUDGE COLWELL: Well, that is a big concern of mine. This is an investigation. It's more far-reaching than, say, a complaint would have been. We're allowed to bring in a whole lot of information and sift through it, but we have to get it.

MR. ARFAA: If I may I approach you later in this hearing, I may have further information.

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JUDGE COLWELL: I'll be here. Do you have anything else?

MR. ARFAA: Thank you very much for your attention, and thank you for the opportunity to present today.

> JUDGE COLWELL: Sure.

Mr. Stern, did you want to speak?

MR. STERN: Yes, thank you, Your Honor. speak for Nextel and T-Mobile.

I will reiterate Mr. Arfaa's statement. We did not ask for leave to withdraw as a result of this motion. We clearly understand the question says should. To 13 | the extent that we're raising a policy matter, it's an important question; and we've never indicated in our motion that the policy question should not be addressed. Many parties here raise the policy question, and it's up to us to either respond, or we can raise a policy question. We never suggested in the motion that, to the extent the Commission is asking a policy question, that it not be before Your Honor.

But what we do have is a situation where my clients need to know whether their interests in the other questions which are all related -- should access charges be reduced, what should the size of the Fund be -- we need to know whether our interest is pecuniary or merely academic at

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this point. To the extent that we have no pecuniary
interest, then it becomes an academic exercise for us.
That's an important distinction for us, and it's also an
important distinction for the other parties.

I think there is certain legal framework
questions imbedded in this proceeding, one of them is
whether or not under the present state of the law the CMRS
providers have an obligation to contribute to any Universal
Service Fund that the Public Utility Commission may have the
authority to establish and administer. That is one; but, as
our pre-hearing memo suggests, there may be other legal
issues.

But that is an important threshold question that we feel needs to be answered; and, at this point, we're not getting a sense that anybody disagrees with us that the question up front establishes an important tone, mode. The interests of the parties in this proceeding as to what is pecuniary or is it academic, our position is at this point we need a clear answer to that so we know what our interests are in this proceeding going forward, nowhere having suggested that policy questions the Commission should be looking at should not be raised and should not be addressed.

With respect to the specifics of the points of law, I generally agree with Mr. Arfaa. In so many words, the rural carriers have essentially tried what GTE tried to

do in the Commonwealth Court case, basically said wireless
carriers are required to contribute notwithstanding the fact
that they are not public utilities. And the Court there
basically said, we see nothing in federal law, they are not
public utilities, they're not state law jurisdiction, and we
see nothing in federal law that mandates wireless carriers
contribute to a USF.

And, in so many words, boiling it down, that's basically what their argument is, and that's heard and dealt with by the Commonwealth Court. And, I guess with that I am generally agreeing with everything else Mr. Arfaa has said.

JUDGE COLWELL: Okay. Are you prepared to say on the record today that, if I grant this motion, you will continue to participate in this case and you will give the answers to the questions that the Commission has asked? What I'm trying to avoid is having discovery requests both out or anything else with you coming forward and saying, well, you don't have jurisdiction over us. I don't have to do that.

MR. STERN: To the extent that the discovery

-- to the extent that the issue goes to assumption of us as
being jurisdictional, I would say, Your Honor, that we would
not raise the position that goes to the Commission's
existing jurisdiction; and we would have a problem with

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that. To the extent it does not, we're here. We didn't ask for leave to intervene.

The legal framework -- within the legal 4 | framework -- if the legal framework is established, yes, the wireless carriers are not obligated under the present law to contribute to a Universal Service Fund. To the extent any questions underlying -- the premise of the question is, we have an obligation to contribute, we would reserve the right to object. To the extent that it's a policy question, we have no basis for an objection.

JUDGE COLWELL: All right. Let's get a 12 ||little more specific then. What I want you to be able to tell me is, if sometime in the future the Commission gains jurisdiction over wireless carriers, how would they know ||what to assess? Why or why would they not be included? Will the Commission need to require wireless carriers to register? What would wireless carriers' contributions be based on? Do wireless companies split their revenue base by intrastate and, if not, will this be a problem?

MR. STERN: If the questions posed are hypothetical, that's one thing. If the question is posed as pecuniary, that's another. If the questions are posed as hypothetical and we're in the proceeding, we can answer a hypothetical question. I think the parties need to know whether that question is hypothetical or actually talking

about real dollars that are going into a real fund with a real pot of money. That, after this proceeding, here is a fund with X dollars and here's who contributes. I think it puts a different -- that question in a different light.

JUDGE COLWELL: I understand that.

MR. STERN: And that's what we're saying,
Your Honor. We need to understand these questions in light
of the state of the existing law, and we can conduct
ourselves and the other parties can conduct themselves
accordingly in this proceeding.

JUDGE COLWELL: Okay. I think I understand your argument. Do you have any other points you need to make?

MR. STERN: No, Your Honor.

JUDGE COLWELL: All right. Thank you.

Ms. Benedek, you're the only other one who said something that would put you in this ballpark on this side of the court on the side of the wireless carriers.

MS. BENEDEK: We would procedurally agree with everything that the wireless carriers have mentioned in their motion. In answer to your questions -- I think you raised some very good points -- on the issue of how to tell them what we need -- the Commission needs without a record, I think it gets back to the fundamental question what authority this Commission has.

While they addressed that from a statutory standpoint, I would only add that the Commission has an adjudicatory function and it has a factfinding function. In order to determine which one, you'd have to have a legislative case to determine. And I think, fundamentally, what the wireless carriers raise and the question you're asking is, how do you get that authority if it's not -- if it's not abundantly clear in the statutory scheme?

In answer to the AT&T point, I think you're looking -- and the Commission is confronted with a lobbying issue, and I'm not sure that it's strictly AT&T -- that's not that sort of a question that you get to before you can split it off into an adjudicatory or factfinding function.

From a logistical standpoint, how many wireless carriers? We have several in the room here but not all of them. There are some logistical questions. So, even if you propose it from a hypothetical standpoint, you're still going to have a record that is far from complete. We can opine as to how the central issue should look like, but do you really need that sort of hypothetical record to do what I think you're suggesting and the Commission is suggesting in question number 6 by saying, it's a lobbying issue?

We concur substantively without getting into each argument with a majority of the arguments raised by the

wireless carriers. So I think that the fundamental technical issue is a timing issue. If they withdrew from the case tomorrow and the question went forward, they would be at risk. The record is going to be incomplete. You don't have every wireless carrier here. I think it's a key question which requires certification.

We don't agree with the bifurcation piece simply because we don't want to be litigating something in two forums. So, it's at least an economy issue. We don't understand the bifurcation request. But, from a substantive standpoint and a procedural standpoint, they're very important questions that they've raised and they do merit attention.

And, on the final point about the impact of the scheduling, Sprint's only request in that regard is that there be a reasonable delay of some sort, not saying months and months, but some time for the Commission to review this important question and to make a determination. We do reiterate adjudicatory factfinding function in asking that question.

In all due respect, do you have any questions?

Ms. Armstrong, before you start, I should ask if anyone else wants to speak on behalf of that side of the

Thank you.

JUDGE COLWELL: I do not.

issue?

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MR. SNISCAK: Your Honor, Verizon endorses the wireless carriers' position.

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JUDGE COLWELL: Mr. Gray.

after Ms. Armstrong.

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MR. GRAY: Yes. I'll be happen to speak

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JUDGE COLWELL: Which side are you arguing?

MR. GRAY: Well, I'd like to first clear up some misstatements that have already been made this afternoon and then to explain our position, which is I believe that the motion is premature and should be dismissed.

JUDGE COLWELL: Okay. We'll let Ms. Armstrong go first.

MS. ARMSTRONG: Thank you, Your Honor.

The Commission has posed a question as to whether or not, after a given date, the wireless carriers should contribute to the Fund. The wireless carriers had filed a motion. We have no objection to ruling on that motion. We have, however, indicated that we believe the Commission could, if they so desired, authorize a Universal Service Fund contribution by the wireless carriers.

Mr. Arfaa addressed three different perspectives. He addressed the policy, a state, and a federal perspective. Clearly, on the policy perspective, we

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1 have a policy in Title 66 for the promotion of Universal Service. The federal statute clearly has a provision for the promotion of Universal Service; and, in fact, states all across the country have established -- the vast majority of them -- Universal Service Funds for the very purpose of assuring that high-class areas are able to have telephone service at rates equivalent to that which we experience in Harrisburg in other urban areas. So I think there's no doubt there's a well-established policy for Universal Service Funds generally and, in fact, the vast majority of them have wireless contributors.

In terms of our state statute, Mr. Arfaa 13 | referred to 501 and 3009; and, as he noted, 3009 is now 3019. Between those two sections and the policy statement, we think the state does have the adequate basis in the statute to authorize wireless contributions; and, in fact, we would point out if you look at 3019 it very clearly makes a distinction between public utilities and telecommunications carriers. And we think, had the |legislature intended to exclude wireless carriers and to limit telecommunications carriers from public utility, it could have so stated. It didn't.

And, as we indicated in our answer in paragraph 23 that, while the Commission cannot regulate CMRS carriers as public utilities, they, in fact, are still

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1 authorized to develop Universal Service Fund mechanisms and, lif they so desire, to determine who should contribute to it, including wireless carriers.

And, finally, there is the federal statute which we addressed at length in our answer to their motion, which very clearly directs that states may, and we quoted some cases where, in fact, we talk about state commissions authorizing contributions by wireless carriers and that has, in fact, been done in other states.

However, what we have said is that we have no objection to the Commission ruling on it. We attached and circulated a proposed schedule yesterday which would be 13 | geared on the resolution of this issue because, in fact, we do understand how it may impact certain practical aspects of this proceeding going forward and the testimony the parties would present. However, it goes back to one of our positions all throughout this proceeding, and that is that the Commission really at this point in time should be waiting for the FCC to resolve it its intercarrier problem.

The FCC is going to do whatever it is going to do relative to wireless contributions; and, presumably, since they contribute at the federal level already, they would continue to contribute to a larger or combined Universal Service Fund. And, therefore, we think that, when you look at the practical ramifications of Pennsylvania

going forward with this proceeding while at the same time the feds are going forward with intercarrier comp which may well preempt the states all together, that this is evidence of the fact of why it really is a nonjudicious expenditure of time and effort to the Court on this proceeding simultaneously with the FCC doing the same thing when, in fact they have published their notice, have a deadline set for comments and reply comments with the expectation to have a decision out this year.

And I guess one of the other things that concerns us is that we would expect many of the parties in this room and probably the Commission itself will be filing comments at the FCC. We find that a very difficult position for the rural carriers to have the Commission actively involved in telling the FCC how it should resolve intercarrier comp when, in fact, this proceeding is ongoing to determine in effect what state access reform would be when it's very likely to be impacted by what the feds do.

And, as I said, we have indicated we think there's justification for requiring wireless carriers. We think it's an appropriate question to resolve, but we really think that it -- our underlying premise is that this proceeding should not go forward at this time. Thank you.

JUDGE COLWELL: Okay.

Mr. Gray, I think you're up.

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MR. GRAY: Thank you, Your Honor.

I think you pointed out earlier this is an I docket, is it not?

JUDGE COLWELL: It is.

MR. GRAY: So this is an investigation to create a record for the Commission, and I believe the Commission's order to you was the question about should the wireless carriers be included and create a record on that fact; is that a fair statement?

JUDGE COLWELL: Well, let's take a look.
That's the words they used, yes.

MR. GRAY: So, if it's an investigation -obviously it's not a C docket -- the question is on this
motion what's the necessity of getting the wireless carriers
out now? We've heard the argument pecuniary versus
academic, okay. But what is the harm of keeping them in
here? You have a duty to create this record as the
Commission has asked for.

We've now heard lots of oral argument that helps create that record, and that will be a useful amount of information to have over the course of the entire proceeding. But, if they stayed in, you answered their motion today and said, no, in this proceeding, they talk about the impact that they have to look at this from a pecuniary standpoint.

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Well, we have two sides of this case. We have the calculation of possible access charge reductions and USF Fund which may or may not pay for that. But Mr. Eckenrod of the OTS has quite a few expert witnesses who are perfectly capable of making a calculation and that calculation is this. If it's determined that the rural access charges have to be reduced by a certain amount of money and that's going to cost a USF \$10 million, whether the wireless carriers are in or out, is a simple calculation that his experts can do in the bat of an eye.

So it seems to me there's no real hardship on the wireless carriers to be here, contribute to the record, and help you answer the Commission's question.

Now, all this other argument might be -- Mr.

Arfaa might be completely correct on everything he said, but

I argue for the purposes of this motion and this

investigation it's irrelevant at this point. You're trying

to create a record. We're here to help you.

That's all I have.

JUDGE COLWELL: I like that we're here to help you part. All right. Thank you, Mr. Gray.

Mr. Kohler didn't come. You're here on his behalf. Would you like to speak?

MR. STEWART: Well, thank you, Your Honor.

Mark Stewart on behalf of AT&T.

And primarily I will rely on the answer that was filed already. I don't want to be redundant of what's already been said. Certainly I think it's laid out in our answer that we believe there's a policy basis for them to be included and also that the Commission has the authority to do so.

I guess I'll direct my comments at what seems to me to be a new type of relief that they're requesting, at least that's the way I read their motion and the comments we heard this morning. It basically seems like the movants are saying, we'll stay in this proceeding, we'll answer your questions so long as the Commission says right now, up front that they'll never include us in any Universal Service Fund; and I believe that's premature.

I think it ties the hands of the Commission should it determine that it does have the authority to include them. They will be left with an inaccurate record. And I just basically think that, at this point in time, as Mr. Gray just said, it's clear that the Commission intended them to be in this proceeding and fully participate; and we ask that the motion be denied.

Thank you.

JUDGE COLWELL: Thank you.

Any other counsel wish to speak on this

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Mr. Stern.

MR. STERN: May I just reply to Mr. Gray?

JUDGE COLWELL: You may.

MR. STERN: I'm hearing a couple things. If it's that simple to figure out what our contribution size ought to be, why do you need us here for that question in terms of the numbers? But it is important. Your Honor's going to do an investigation. Your Honor is going to make a recommendation. If Your Honor recommends that wireless carriers do contribute and Commission has jurisdiction to assess, then the Commission's final order says we will assess wireless carriers and they will contribute. They may adopt your recommendation.

But why go through the whole proceeding if that's not the correct state of the law? Why don't we know that up front so that Your Honor's recommendation has the legal framework to establish up front. It is more than just -- Mr. Gray is minimizing the extent of what we're asking for here, Your Honor.

Thank you.

JUDGE COLWELL: Ms. Armstrong.

MS. ARMSTRONG: Your Honor, I only have one point that I wanted to make; and that is that, when you look at the question which brings the matter before you, there is the lead into that question. It says, if the Fund continues

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beyond December 31, 2006. To the extent that that in any way impacts your perception of the question, I think that is a red herring, a misstatement, a fallacious assumption or presumption that there is any pumpkin date to the Universal Service Fund.

I think the people in this room would agree
that, as the regulations stand now and as the parties agreed
in the last such proceeding -- those who were in that
proceeding -- the USF Fund and the underlying implementing
regulations will continue until further order and rulemaking
of this Commission, whenever that may be. The 2006 date was
merely a timeframe during which parties would not challenge,
if you will, the current structure of the Fund. It will not
disappear come December 31, 2006.

So, to the extent that that has any impact upon your resolution of the rest of the question that goes with it, that language is really meaningless.

MS. BENEDEK: I concur in Ms. Armstrong's comments.

JUDGE COLWELL: Any other comments before we finish this?

Mr. Arfaa.

MR. ARFAA: May I address a couple points?

JUDGE COLWELL: If you speak slowly.

MR. ARFAA: First of all, I wanted to address

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1 |one of the comments by AT&T. As I read AT&T's submission asking for denial of our motion, rather, if it is denied, a recommendation that the Commission also seek amendment to the statute if they conclude the statute not does permit the inclusion of the wireless carriers. I think that, obviously, should be on the record.

Now, Ms. Armstrong made three points. First, she said that states all across the country have a state Universal Service Fund. I believe she said the vast majority. I would refer you to a February, 2002 report of the General Accounting Office on Telecommunications, Federal 12 and State Universal Service Fund Programs and Challenges to 13 ||Funding, GAO-02-187. In Appendix 3, you'll see a chart of which states do have high cost of local telephone company funds, and it's about half. Just so that's clear on the record.

Now, Ms. Armstrong also posited that, between \parallel the policy statement at 501 and 3019, there is authority. But what she did not address was the -- pardon me. She said, if the legislature intended to exclude address. wireless, they would have said so. They did not. Respectfully, that's incorrect. They defined telecommunications carriers in 3012 as those carriers providing telecommunications over which the Commission has jurisdiction. As I said before, it doesn't include my

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client or Mr. Stern's.

Finally, she referred to the number of state decisions in their brief where they found that state commissions did have authority to impose contribution obligations on wireless carriers. Principally, it was a 6 Texas Commission decision involving the Texas Commission. just want to point out, in that case, the statute in that case expressly required wireless carriers to contribute to the Universal Service Fund. There is no such statute in Pennsylvania.

This is actually recognized in 6-point type in footnote 3, I think, of page 10 -- or footnote 10 on page 3 -- footnote 3 on page 10. Just for the record, that statute is Section 56.02 -- sorry, 51.002 utility definitions in the Texas Utilities Code; and it basically requires all telecommunications providers to contribute to the Fund, and it expressly defines telecommunications provider as including a provider of commercial mobile service.

Here we have the opposite. We have Chapter 30, if that provides authority for the Fund. It says telecommunications carriers, which they claim is jurisdictional, which goes back to the definition which excludes them.

> That's all I have. Thank you.

JUDGE COLWELL: Thank you.

All right. Last call. Does anybody have

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MS. ARMSTRONG: May I briefly respond to Mr.

||Arfaa?

JUDGE COLWELL: You may.

MS. ARMSTRONG: Thank you, Your Honor.

Mr. Arfaa missed two points that I want to address. One very briefly is that 3019 does refer to telecommunications carriers. And, when you go back to the definition of telecommunications carriers, it does not say public utility. It makes the distinction between -- what it says is carriers over which the Commission has jurisdiction. It could have said public utilities. It didn't. And I think, given the history of the Commission, the history of this issue, that the legislature intended there to be a difference.

It didn't say public utilities, and it's the broader definition of telecommunications carriers including such facts as the Commission approves wireless interconnection agreements. They have limited jurisdiction over wireless carriers, not for purposes of rates, etc.

The other point that I would like to note is that, if you look at the end of the local appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision we cited in our brief,

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the Court really concludes that federal and state statutes authorize USF. They do recognize the role that the federal statute has in creating and authorizing the state to have a Universal Service Fund, and I think that's an important matter to recognize.

MR. GRAY: Your Honor, may I make one last comment?

JUDGE COLWELL: You may.

MR. GRAY: Thank you.

You have quite a level of disagreement here. You have excellent data provided by Mr. Arfaa. To me, in some sense, his example begs the question. It should give you an idea how much information is out there, how much -- that was 2002 data, three years old. You have a lot of expert witnesses who are available here. There is a great deal of information out there, data and legal disagreement.

And so, if you're conducting an I docket, that's exactly the sort of thing that goes into the record. So to me, the more we disagree, the more we find, look at the same set of statistics, okay. Half of the states have this program, half don't. That asks a lot of questions in and of itself. So to me the more disagreement the more arguments that they need to be here to provide us with this information.

And, to clear up something that was said

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earlier, the OSBA didn't agree with an expedited conclusion of this. We would rather have them in the whole proceeding and provide this information.

JUDGE COLWELL: I got that.

Anyone else?

(No response.)

JUDGE COLWELL: All right. Thank you very much. I have a lot of information, a lot of good arguments. I am not prepared to rule on that today, but I will give you something in writing as soon as I can get it done.

We'll move on to the rest of case at this point. Also, I got some very extensive pre-hearing memos where I was surprised at how little agreement this is among this group for anything. I suppose the first issue we really need to discuss is the federal proceeding that may --it's almost guaranteed to have some effect on what we're doing here. I have everything from we shouldn't do anything until they're done to we shouldn't let that slow us down because of the way things are going.

I have to set a schedule so that this particular proceeding doesn't get lost in the shuffle because, if I don't give you some deadlines, you're going to go back to your offices and work on cases that do have deadlines. So I have several recommendations on what to do here.

I don't want to do anything until I have ruled on your motion, the wireless carriers' motion. I'm having a hard time figuring out how long it's going to take me to do that. I have another case right now that is quite pressing, so I don't want to be giving myself the same deadline as I have in that one. And that one, quite honestly, my opinion in that one has to be ready on May 16th. So my decision on this motion will most likely be after that.

MS. PAINTER: Your Honor, if I might.

JUDGE COLWELL: You might.

MS. PAINTER: No carrier has proposed that initial testimony begin until mid to late July. I think that gives you plenty of time, I hope, to resolve this matter and then have the case start.

JUDGE COLWELL: Okay.

So, Ms. Armstrong, you've confused me with numbers. You have 30 days and 60 days.

MS. ARMSTRONG: Your Honor, that was because all of those dates are intended to be triggered off of the final ruling on the wireless motion. So, if that were May 15th, the first one would be 30 days from May 15th. If it was May 30th, it would be 30 days from May 30th. And then the days are not cumulative. In other words, 60 days is not 30 days after 30 days, it's 60 days from that date. So,

whatever those dates are, it's the next number of days until the next deadline.

JUDGE COLWELL: We'll have to work something out.

Go ahead.

MR. STEWART: Excuse me, Your Honor, just a point of clarification. It seems like it's from the final PUC order on the motion not necessarily Your Honor's ruling.

MR. POVILAITIS: Your Honor, speaking for Quest, we think that's a very fundamental point that Mr. Stewart brought up. We think the wireless jurisdictional issue has all the earmarkings of a matter that could reside at the Commission level for some time. Quest would certainly oppose any schedule that did not commence the litigation that goes on in this case until at least we had in hand a Commission ruling on that motion.

JUDGE COLWELL: As we all know, there's just no way to predict when that is going to be no matter what I do.

MR. ARFAA: Your Honor, I also wanted to point out there are at least some nominal deadlines in interlocutory review rules that might provide some structure and impetus to a more rapid decision. My only point is that that at least gives a breakpoint where we could, at least on an aspirational basis, hope for a more rapid conclusion.

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JUDGE COLWELL: I'll try to wrap this up with a recommendation here. Do all of you have this (indicating)? Have you all seen it? Does anybody have a problem with it?

MS. PAINTER: MCI has two problems with it.

First, waiting until the Commission finally disposes of the wireless motion because that's who knows when that could happen. Second of all, I think the dates in here are quite slow. I mean, if you do decide to wait, we have known about this case now for several months.

There's no reason to take 60 days after -well, really 90 days after we get the Commission order to
file testimony and another 50 days to file reply testimony.
Normally cases have maybe a week after the last round of
testimony between that and the hearings. I just don't think
it's necessary to have this much time between filings.

MCI was hoping to have at least a recommended decision and hopefully finalized exceptions by the end of the year so this case is before the Commission by the end of the year, especially because we have no idea when the Commission would issue a final decision on the wireless motion.

JUDGE COLWELL: But how does that jive with the federal schedule?

MS. PAINTER: That's another issue. The

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question is, do we wait for the federal schedule; and MCI would say no. The Commission knew about the fact that the **||FCC was addressing this issue when they established this** case. Remember the Commission established this case by themselves. They knew at the time that they established this case -- the fact that we've been waiting for something on the federal side is not new.

In fact, there is a case last summer that was litigated in front of Judge Cocheres on local calling areas; and many of the parties' positions in that case was, let's wait for the FCC, they're just about to do something. was a year ago. I think we have no idea when the FCC is going to finalize a decision. The Commission knew that the FCC had this issue before it when they initiated this case and requested that the case be litigated. So to delay it would be contrary to what the Commission did in terms of establishing this case in the first place.

> JUDGE COLWELL: That's a very good point. Go ahead, Mr. Povilaitis.

MR. POVILAITIS: Quest generally supports MCI's comments here, Your Honor. The fact of the matter is, there is no schedule for the FCC proceeding. It guarantees a completed order by a certain amount of time. somewhat infamous for not hitting those kinds of deadlines. $_{25}$ \parallel I just harken back to the significant TRO order at issue.

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The point I make in reference to the TRO is, not only do you have to wait until there's an FCC decision, in the case of a TRO there's about six months between the making of the FCC decision and the actual issuance of the order that gave us clear guidance on what these issues were. So we strongly support MCI's position that we should not try to tailor our schedule to when we think the FCC is going to rule on something.

And certainly the IXCs have a proposed schedule. It wasn't satisfactory to the other parties.

AT&T, MCI, and Quest agreed that and proposed that we have the first round of testimony in this case mid to late July.

We have a second round the third week of August. We then go to hearings in mid September, briefs in early October, reply briefs the third week of October. And that, at least, positions you with a schedule to possibly do something by the end of the calendar year.

We think starting the first round of testimony in mid to late July creates the window that we need for the Commission to possibly act on the wireless carriers. Certainly, if they're going to act, it should be in hand by then. If they do not wish to state their position on that issue in the near term, at least they will have it and we need to move on.

JUDGE COLWELL: Ms. Benedek.

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MS. BENEDEK: I was just going to note that the Commission started -- I see Ms. Armstrong raising her hand over there. The order instituting this investigation was started as a result of a settlement that was approved, and there were some hard deadlines in the settlement. One noted was a January 1, 2006 stop point in review. So the order started from a prior proceeding, and it has sort of snowballed into this let's get this done quick, and that was picked up by the IXCs.

It is Sprint's position in our pre-hearing memo that there are these federal efforts underway. And, also, the federal orders that were instituted, they came up after the Commission instituted this investigation. The federal order is a rulemaking docket; and reply comments in that federal docket, I believe, are due June 22nd.

I'm not necessarily opposed to a mid July schedule to start this; however, we think that the RTC companies have presented a workable alternative and it should be given some weight.

JUDGE COLWELL: Mr. Cheskis.

MR. CHESKIS: Your Honor, Joel Cheskis for the OCA.

I did just want to note as we pointed out in our pre-hearing memo that there had been a schedule established for the, what I would consider to be, companion

to this, the Verizon access charge case. We did put those dates in our pre-hearing memo and would ask you to consider those as we establish a schedule for this proceeding.

What Mr. Povilaitis was saying when he was articulating his schedule. I think there would be some conflict with what he said; but, to the extent that we can accommodate the Verizon access case, I think that we're actually probably pretty close to what Ms. Armstrong has proposed for the RTCC.

JUDGE COLWELL: Okay. You're assuming that the starting date for her schedule is when?

MR. CHESKIS: Well, you had expressed a concern about deciding the wireless motion before the middle of May. To the extent that you can decide that shortly thereafter, she expressed 90 days from then to have direct testimony. So that would bring a direct testimony due date sometime in August which, again, I think Mr. Povilaitis was talking about direct testimony sometime in July. I don't think we're that far off.

To the extent that we can consider the Verizon access case, I think that would put us into the realm of what the RTCC proposal is and not too far from what I think Mr. Povilaitis is proposing.

MR. POVILAITIS: Just quickly, Your Honor, the RTC proposal calls for none of this happening until

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there's a final Commission order. So that's an ambiguity that we think has an enormous impact.

JUDGE COLWELL: Okay.

MR. STEWART: Unless they're amending their proposal to have it start from the date of Your Honor's decision as opposed to entry of a PUC final order, I'm asking a question I guess.

JUDGE COLWELL: Ms. Armstrong, how do you feel about that?

MS. ARMSTRONG: Your Honor, if I might respond to some of the other things, and I will answer that before I conclude. We have no problem in trying to accommodate other conflicting schedules. The Verizon arbitration is one, and I know Ms. Painter raised the Verizon remand. Obviously we're the same parties. We can't be in two places at once. We have no problem in trying to accommodate the fact that some have superimposed deadlines. That part's fine.

As Ms. Benedek noted, the FCC matter came out after the Commission order instituting this proceeding. She indicated it wasn't because the Commission was out to move along expeditiously an investigation that they wanted. It was done as a result of a commitment from a prior order; and, since that time, the FCC has set timeframes and has, in fact, stated that they intend to resolve this case this

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year. I know that is no guarantee, but that's what they've publicly stated.

I don't know whether it was Mr. Povilaitis or Mr. Arfaa, but someone indicated that the FCC could issue a decision now or vote on a matter now, and it would take months until a decision comes out. That's true; but, if they came out and said we're going to preempt the states, it would be pretty silly for us to go forward and try and ask for something they have voted to preempt.

JUDGE COLWELL: If they don't say that, we'll kick ourselves for not going forward with the case.

MS. ARMSTRONG: I understand that there are some downside risks in that. That's one of the reasons why we gave you the alternative schedule, which was developed off of a disposition on the wireless motion because we feel that has consequences as to how this proceeding is conducted.

The other thing that I wanted to mention is the concern that -- well, in other cases we filed testimony, you know, within a few weeks of having filed main testimony, and so we have hearings shortly thereafter. As Mr. Gray pointed out, this is a very different proceeding. It is an investigation. It's not where someone has come in and stacked a rate case where you take 60 days to have a pre-hearing and another 60 days to have rebuttal testimony.

We are talking about -- there's been no prefiled testimony. There is a whole host of issues if you look in the pre-hearing memos from the AT&T calling cards to intrastate versus interstate arbitrage of how the calls are classified. There's an endless list of issues; and that was why we suggested that, once your ruling comes down and we then decide exactly what those issues are going to be and have 60 days to file testimony.

We don't think given the facts of this case, the fact that there is no prefiled testimony, it's not the black-and-white, cut-and-dry proceeding format that we normally follow, so our proposal is reasonable. Are we willing to amend it to say that it's after Your Honor's disposition? I think we're probably willing to do that. To be perfectly honest, I wasn't sure you were going to rule on it. I thought they were going to take it to the Commission. We can do it following yours, at least we will have some insight and hopefully the Commission will then act on it within the 90 days prior to testimony.

MS. BENEDEK: Your Honor, I would only add one thing. If the wireless carriers win, then discovery has to be depended on and vice versa. I don't think that this is a cut-and-dry case as Ms. Armstrong has presented.

The other issue here is that Verizon has indicated that Verizon is the largest payer to the Universal

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Service Fund and indicated its support of the wireless motion.

MR. STERN: Your Honor, may I respond? It's hard for me to hear all of that but just a couple of points.

We support the rural carriers from the standpoint that we think it's a legitimate and reasonable question for the Commission whether this proceeding should be deferred in light of the FCC's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which came out after this Commission's order of December 20th. As Ms. Benedek points out, it was a follow-through of the July, '03 order to start a proceeding.

The FCC now has deadlines and timeframes for the filing of comments and reply comments. We don't know what the Law Bureau may or may not file on behalf of the Commission in this case; but, the Commission should at least have the opportunity to decide whether the positions they take at the FCC have some bearing on what another part of something the Commission is investigating internally. That question has not been before the Commission because, if it were, at the time the order came out, because there were no comments filed. All the parties will be filing comments.

It just doesn't seem to make sense from a judicial economy standpoint and from the resources of the Commission and the parties to at least not ask the Commission whether or not, in light of the FCC notice coming

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out, where issues as to whether the FCC will assert jurisdiction over intrastate Universal Service mechanisms has been put on the table. Whether or not it's reasonable to ask the Commission whether, in light of all that, they would like this proceeding to continue or not pending the FCC's determination.

For purposes of that, we did point out that we agree that the current USF in place does not expire, which is not to say we agree whether or not the Commission has authority for USF; but, to the extent it is in place, it does not expire. It can continue on beyond December 31st, '06. There is no deadline that the Commission has to be concerned about from that standpoint.

So, having said all those things, we would support any movement to the Commission which to -- imposing the question to the Commission whether this proceeding ought to continue.

With respect to the schedule, assuming that the proceeding continues on, we have recommended a phase one, Your Honor, and that phase one essentially is somewhat what we talked about with respect to our motion. There are certain legal threshold questions that are the legal framework for this factfinding. We have raised a couple of legal questions that we think are important and significant that needed to be established for this framework.

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one, in light of new law, does the Commission, in fact, still have an authority or did they ever have an authority to establish a Universal Service Fund?

We have a new Chapter 30. It's not the old 5 Chapter 30. There are some issues there. I don't need to \parallel get into all of them. I'm not here to argue them. suggest this be briefed. Chapter 30 apparently states that the Commission has less authority over interexchange carriers. Does that mean that, in the past what the Commission has ordered as flow-through of access charge reduction to customers, does that mean that it can no longer 12 | be done? What is the jurisdiction of the Commission to order interexchange carriers to flow through access charge reductions? That seems to the wireless carriers that's a question that needs to be decided up front.

The Office of Consumer Advocate has referenced 3015G of the new law; and, although it's not exactly clear, but it seems to be suggesting that the \$18 cap established in the prior order is immutable. It cannot be increased. I don't know if that's their position or not, but that is a legal question that is going to have some bearing on the outcome of this case.

We have raised and issue, Your Honor, with respect to the regulations. The regulations currently state that the surcharges are prohibited. Well, the FCC just

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issued a truth-in-billing decision, which says that, at least with respect to wireless carriers, surcharge prohibitions are unlawful. So that is a legal question.

All these questions establish a framework which we believe that Your Honor should at least identify some ground rules up front so that all of us know what we're trying to do in the factfinding because we can proceed with factfinding. We can go on and on; but, at the end of the day, it has to fit into the legal framework. And our position is at least some of these legal issues should be decided up front so we all know the ground rules and the framework and what the superstructure is to some extent, what we're working with here.

So we would suggest a phase one. We did put a schedule together that -- well, it's hard to tell where it fits with this one. I don't know where it begins and ends, although we would agree that we do want a final Commission decision with respect to our wireless motion.

Having said that, if the question of the deferral is put up, the Commission decides to defer the proceeding, although, while we would want a final answer, I guess it's somewhat moot whether the Commission gives a final answer if this proceeding does not continue on. So -- but we do think the deferral question ought to be sent up.

As I indicated, we tried to accommodate Your

Honor's schedule to get something done reasonably close to the end of the year but have a firm briefing for certain legal issues. Any party is free to go ahead and bring up any other legal issues they wish. At least those four were those we either pulled out of our pre-hearing memo or other parties' pre-hearing memoranda.

Thank you, Your Honor.

JUDGE COLWELL: Mr. Povilaitis.

MR. POVILAITIS: Your Honor, you've been asked to take into account many, many considerations in trying to do what is normally a relatively simple task of setting a schedule in this case. The fact remains some schedule has to be set and fairly soon. Quest would bring two matters on that issue to your attention.

One, there has been a fair amount of argument about what to make of the FCC proceeding, and it's been suggested and implied that one reason to delay this is to see whether or not there is some kind of broad FCC preemption of access charge on USF jurisdiction at the state level. We would suggest that that's a bit of a red herring in that, even if that happens, I think you would hardly find that all the parties in this case simply acknowledge that declaration of preemption and say, we'll comply. That would only be the start of probably a multiyear legal struggle to resist that kind of broad preemption. And, if our case and

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our issues were still pending until that were resolved, it would be very unfortunate.

The second point I'll make is that, with respect to the specifics of the RTCC time schedule, some of these timeframes are simply generous. I just point out to 50 days to file responsive testimony to previously filed testimony, that's somewhat unusual in its expanse. Forty days before hearings start after all testimony's been submitted, I think, is another example why these timeframes are just too generous. I certainly can say for the record I favor the IXCs' approach.

JUDGE COLWELL: Yes, ma'am.

MS. PAINTER: I have two points in response to some of the matters that have been addressed. First of all, to imply that the Commission somehow was not aware that the FCC was acting on similar issues I think does not recognize reality. The Commission -- as you know, there is another access case that is going on, which is the Verizon access case.

And, in that case which was established around the same -- I don't remember the exact timeframe that that case was established -- but we already have a hearing scheduled in that case. The Commission has specifically asked the parties to address the impact of the FCC action. So the Commission did not terminate that case. They

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1 actually asked for it to be incorporated, which I assume will be the same thing that will be done here. All the parties would incorporate that into their testimony.

Second of all, the request for a phase one | 5 | and phase two to address legal versus factual issues I think 6 | that is somewhat unprecedented. Every case has legal and factual issues that are before this Commission, and I just don't think it would make much sense to separate those two The parties can address those legal issues as part of out. their briefs, and that would be part of your recommended decision. I don't think it's necessary to have two different phases.

JUDGE COLWELL: That's how I see it, too.

Anybody else?

Ms. Armstrong.

MS. ARMSTRONG: Three matters, Your Honor. One, I would like to point out that the Verizon access proceeding is a remand. It's not a new investigation; and, while the parties in the proceeding have a great deal of disagreement as to the focus of that proceeding, my sense is that most of that proceeding should be a relatively narrow proceeding where certain issues that were remanded by the Commission are to be addressed. It's not an open access investigation like this one at least is turning out to be in the eyes of the parties.

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JUDGE COLWELL: I understand that; but, since they do have a schedule and the same parties are going to be involved, we just don't want them to conflict.

MS. ARMSTRONG: I don't disagree with that.

I was responding to Ms. Painter's sense that, because in
that proceeding they were moving more quickly, that that had
to apply here. I'm saying that they're two very different
proceedings. Clearly, they should not conflict.

MS. PAINTER: That was not my implication.

My implication was that this case should not be suspended

merely because there is an FCC proceeding ongoing. The

Commission was aware of that FCC proceeding and did not

necessarily terminate another access charge case. They

simply said, incorporate the FCC issue into that case.

MS. ARMSTRONG: I understand. That's exactly what I'm saying is that now, after receiving a more narrow access issue where the Commission said, when you're addressing the access issues we're remanding, take this into account. Yes, by then they were aware of the existence of the FCC proceeding. That's not to say that, in this case, it's not appropriate to wait and see.

I heard Mr. Povilaitis say it would be a travesty if we waited, and it would also be a travesty if we put Pennsylvania ratepayers and Pennsylvania companies behind the eight ball because we precipitously did something

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that, contrary to opinion, in fact hurts Pennsylvania because of what they do at the FCC.

And, I guess, maybe one of the guestions I |would have, would it be appropriate, Your Honor, for those 5 of us that believe that the FCC matter is at least of some controlling nature over this proceeding to ask -- I don't think Your Honor can defer this proceeding, and I know the Office of ALJ wants to keep things moving along. Would it be acceptable if we sought some clarification from the Commission as to the role of the FCC proceeding and this one, particularly as was pointed out and Mr. Stern noted, the Commission's taking an active role in that FCC 13 ||proceeding; and it puts us in an awkward position in that light as well?

Would Your Honor have any objection if we brought that to the attention of the Commission? Would that be appropriate?

JUDGE COLWELL: What I can tell you is that I have no intention of asking them myself. I have not certified the question up. I cannot control what you do.

MS. ARMSTRONG: Thank you.

MR. STEWART: Just for the record AT&T strongly supports the position of MCI and Quest. I can say that; but, certainly as to the final order on the wireless motion, this 30-day pre-hearing to finalize the issue could

be 30 days from today next year if we adopt this schedule.

It's just unworkable, and it's hard to say that a proceeding that will end by the end of this year is somehow expedited or being rushed if that was the implication of the case.

JUDGE COLWELL: Okay. Here's what we're going to do. By June 15th, which is a day I've chosen for no other reason than it seems like a good day, I will have my decision on your motion. What you do with it is up to you.

We're going to set a schedule now for the rest of the proceeding; and, if something happens between now and when we implement that to make us change anything, we can all come back. So, from June 15th, that's the starting point, we'll all know how the motion comes out at that point, so now we'll get started.

anything really important during the Verizon and Verizon

North cases. I don't want things to be too stressful on you and your clients. You have to tell me if that's a problem.

You're going to have to tell me if I'm going to pick dates that are a problem because I missed it. Don't assume that I looked at the records and your pre-hearing memos and ignored it. I could have forgotten, but please speak up.

Starting from June 15th, that's a Wednesday. Your initial testimony I think should be due 30 days after

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that. Anybody have a problem with 30 days after that?

JUDGE COLWELL: Ms. Benedek.

MS. BENEDEK: Doesn't that leave enough time to do discovery, particularly if you order that the wireless carriers stay in this case?

Start discovery immediately. They have not told me that they were going to use any finding of lack of jurisdiction to not participate in this case; and I am assuming by that that they will respond to it, even if the Commission has no jurisdiction to assess them or to include them in the Universal Service Fund.

Mr. Cheskis.

MR. CHESKIS: Your Honor, I do have some concerns about the direct testimony due date -
JUDGE COLWELL: Okay.

MR. CHESKIS: -- which I think would be July 15th, solely for the fact that that is right at the crux of hearings, surrebuttal in the Verizon case has just been served, and hearings will be two days the following week.

JUDGE COLWELL: So what do you recommend?

MR. CHESKIS: I would suggest an additional

30 days beyond that, maybe moving it back to August 15th.

JUDGE COLWELL: I'm sensing some discord

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MR. POVILAITIS: Actually, I think that date
  was pretty good, Your Honor.
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                  MS. PAINTER: I don't mind the week after
   that, July 22nd. I remember we had originally talked about
  July 15th, and somebody had a problem with that.
                  MS. ARMSTRONG: You did because of the
  replies in the arbitration, and then the 19th and 20th is
   the Verizon access charge, and the 25th is the remand
  hearing.
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                  MS. PAINTER:
                                That's right.
                  MS. BENEDEK: The briefs in the TRO Verizon
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   arbitration are the 19th.
                  MS. PAINTER: When are the arbitration
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  hearings?
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                  MS. BENEDEK: The hearings are July 24th and
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  25th.
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                   JUDGE COLWELL: How does August 1st work for
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  you?
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                  Everybody like August 1st?
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                  MS. BENEDEK: The briefs on the factual
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   issues are due in the Verizon arbitration that day, but
   we've probably got limited factual issues.
                   MS. PAINTER: Yeah, I'd be surprised if
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   they're --
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                  MS. BENEDEK: I agree.
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JUDGE COLWELL: Okay. The initial testimony is due on August 1st.

Now, how much time do we need for rebuttal? It seems 30 days ought to be enough.

MS. PAINTER: Your Honor, I agree.

MR. POVILAITIS: That's right.

MS. ARMSTRONG: With all due respect with 20-some RTCC companies responding to developing positions on something that we have just seen 30 days before, have not had a real opportunity to do discovery on. As we said, in normal proceedings, everything is final up front; and the issues are narrowed by the time you do that. Here it's going to be our first chance to reply to whatever anybody may be saying. We had originally proposed 60 days, which you took it down to 50. I think that's as far as we're prepared to go.

MR. CHESKIS: Your Honor, the OCA will support that.

JUDGE COLWELL: That seems reasonable.

MR. SNISCAK: Your Honor, for Verizon we would actually prefer somewhere more in the second full week of September for the next round of testimony looking at schedules and availability.

MR. GRAY: The week of the 12th?

MR. SNISCAK: That would work for us.

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MR. GRAY: That's about six weeks, Your
  Honor.
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                  JUDGE COLWELL:
                                   Is six weeks enough?
                  MS. PAINTER: I think that's reasonable, Your
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  Honor.
                  MS. MATZ:
                             Your Honor, we're bickering over a
  week here. Really, this is not a traditional proceeding in
  which you have a position that's known. When it's filed on
  the record, we're going to be seeing positions for the first
  time on August 1st.
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                   JUDGE COLWELL: So that was a no?
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                  MS. MATZ: What I'm saying is, we're
13 bickering over a week.
                  MS. PAINTER: We just extended the direct
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  testimony by two weeks, so now we're bickering over three
  weeks.
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                  MS. MATZ: But the extension on the direct is
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  really not pertinent to the extension on the rebuttal.
                   JUDGE COLWELL: What day are you asking for?
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                  MS. MATZ: Fifty days is what Ms. Armstrong
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   said.
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                  MR. GRAY:
                              September 20th?
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                   JUDGE COLWELL: September 20th.
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                   MR. SNISCAK: Fine with Verizon.
                   JUDGE COLWELL:
                                  Okay.
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You have asked for over a month between rebuttal and hearings. Why?

MS. ARMSTRONG: Well, Your Honor, because of all the parties and the host of issues. We believe that there is a reasonable likelihood that we will get a lot of testimony on rebuttal that is posturing new ideas, new numbers, new concepts that would need to have discovery.

JUDGE COLWELL: That would not be a good thing. Rebuttal is what it is. If they want to issue a lot of new stuff on rebuttal, you can request to have it stricken.

MS. ARMSTRONG: Except, Your Honor, where it's an investigation, they're first putting out their ideas. I may put out an idea that says, we're going to increase rates. And the OCA comes in and says, no, you've got to cut them in half. You're going to end up with discovery on what's really a new issue that they would not have raised in their case in chief because, at least as I envisioned it, part of what we're looking for is not just legal discussion as to whether or not the IXCs can have surcharges, but what are the dollars, how are they going to be moved, where are they going to be moved. And responding to those kinds of proposals and looking at each thing on them is going to take some time.

MR. STEWART: We would submit October 11th or

12th.

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                  JUDGE COLWELL: October?
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                  MR. GRAY: Your Honor, are you going to
  require a third round of testimony?
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                   JUDGE COLWELL: I had not planned to do that,
  and I did not hear an uproar of objection. Okay, then.
   won't do that.
                  So October the what?
                  MS. ARMSTRONG: How about 18 and 19 as a
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   compromise?
                  MS. PAINTER: That's not a compromise.
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                  MS. ARMSTRONG: We had 50 to 60 -- I'm sorry.
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                   JUDGE COLWELL: You had 40 for that one.
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                  MS. ARMSTRONG: We had 40 days.
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                  MR. GRAY: The 11th is a Tuesday, and that's
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   three weeks from rebuttal.
                  MS. PAINTER: We think that's plenty.
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                  MR. POVILAITIS: We think that's plenty.
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                   JUDGE COLWELL: Okay. October 11th and 12th.
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                   Will two days be enough?
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                   MR. STERN: Your Honor, I believe the 12th is
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   a Jewish holiday or it starts.
                   JUDGE COLWELL: I am unaware of that.
                                                          Tell
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  me and then we'll know.
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MS. PAINTER: Yes, it is Yom Kippur.

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make it a hardship on anyone.
                  All right, then, what's the following
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  Tuesday?
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                  MR. GRAY:
                             The following Tuesday is the 18th.
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                  JUDGE COLWELL: We'll go with the 18th.
  win by default. 18th and 19th.
                  Does anybody foresee needing a third day of
8
  |hearings?
                  MS. ARMSTRONG: Your Honor, may I just ask
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  you a question?
12
                   JUDGE COLWELL:
                                  You may.
                  MS. ARMSTRONG: You stated that you would not
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   give a third round of testimony, that's fine. But I do
  presume that, when we present our witnesses on the 18th,
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  they would have an opportunity to respond to what has been
   filed?
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                   JUDGE COLWELL:
                                  Absolutely.
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                   MR. GRAY: Then, Your Honor, schedule three
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   days.
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                   JUDGE COLWELL: Okay. Three days it is, the
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   18th, 19th, and 20th.
                   MS. BENEDEK: I think that's wise.
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                   JUDGE COLWELL: With the hearings on the
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   18th, 19th, and 20th, then the briefing schedule puts us
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JUDGE COLWELL: I certainly do not want to

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need to write these comprehensive briefs that will teach me
   what you're talking about?
                  MS. PAINTER: I would say three weeks would
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  be sufficient time. That would be November 10th, Your
   Honor.
                  MR. GRAY:
                            Is that a State holiday?
7
                                        The next day is.
8
                  JUDGE COLWELL: No.
                                                          The
  11th is a State holiday.
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                  MR. POVILAITIS: That's fine.
                  JUDGE COLWELL: So, if you were planning on a
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  really long weekend, this would mess that up for you.
                  MS. BENEDEK: Can we have electronic
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   circulation between the parties?
                  JUDGE COLWELL: Yes. We'll get to that in a
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   minute.
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                  November 10th main briefs. Reply briefs?
                  MS. ARMSTRONG: November 22nd.
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                  MS. PAINTER: That's fine.
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                  MS. BENEDEK: That's good.
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                   JUDGE COLWELL: Okay. November 22nd reply
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   briefs. I'm sure I can just write that up over
22
   Thanksgiving.
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                  All right. So now we have a schedule that
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   we'll keep unless there's a problem. I'm sure that, if a
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right, snack in the middle of November. How long will you

that happens. Now, manner of service. Parties traditionally have electronic service on the day that the documents are due, with hard copies to follow in the mail thereafter. 7 Is that agreeable to everyone? MR. POVILAITIS: Yes, Your Honor. q MS. BENEDEK: Yes, Your Honor. 10 JUDGE COLWELL: Okay. MS. MATZ: Your Honor, these are in-hand 11 dates electronically? JUDGE COLWELL: That's correct. 13 14 Discovery rules. Does anybody want to change the discovery rules, amend them in any way to suit your 15 purposes? 16 MS. ARMSTRONG: Your Honor, hopefully so far 17 we've been trying to work cooperatively. Given the size of 18 some of my companies and how few people they have working there, we will do our best to work with the parties; but I 20 would hope that they just leave it there and if anybody has a problem come back to me. JUDGE COLWELL: Is that acceptable to 23 everyone? 24

problem will arise, you will tell me about it as soon as

MS. PAINTER: MCI has proposed to set ten

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calendar days for responses to be due and objections within seven days. I don't think parties have ever been inflexible in terms of extending those times if a party needs it. But, at least if we have a shorter timeframe, shorter goal, I think that would help parties.

JUDGE COLWELL: Ten-day response, seven-day objections.

MS. PAINTER: Right, not the calendar days.

JUDGE COLWELL: Anybody object to that?

MS. ARMSTRONG: Your Honor, knowing how many companies we're dealing with and given their size, I just know we're setting a date that is not realistic. That's why I said hopefully we can continue to work with the parties and, provided there's a problem, go to Your Honor. To get them to the companies and their consultants and get feedback and try to get answers in ten days, it's not going to happen.

MS. PAINTER: I know my client in terms of trying to get responses. If you tell them it's due in ten days, maybe you'll get it in 15, instead of telling them it's due in 20 days you'll get it in 30.

JUDGE COLWELL: So on a paper date and a secret date.

MS. PAINTER: It just maybe lights a fire under them hopefully to try to get their response back a

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little more quickly, with the understanding that the parties
  will be flexible.
                  MR. GRAY: And thanks for mentioning that on
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  the record.
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                  MS. PAINTER: That's just trying to get
  things internally.
                   JUDGE COLWELL:
                                   Does anyone else have any
8 | reason to amend the discovery rules?
                   (No response.)
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                   JUDGE COLWELL: Nobody else seems to worry
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  about it?
                  MR. POVILAITIS: We support her.
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                  JUDGE COLWELL: Okay. You support her.
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                  All right, a show of hands. Who supports the
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   amendment?
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                   (Various counsel indicating.)
                   JUDGE COLWELL: Hands show evenly split then.
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                   MR. GRAY: Your Honor, I would say 15 days
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   instead of 20.
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                   JUDGE COLWELL: There's a compromise.
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                   MS. ARMSTRONG: We'll live with the
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   compromise with the understanding that all parties will be
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   flexible.
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                   JUDGE COLWELL: Okay. Fifteen-day response
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   period.
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And objections within? 2 MR. POVILAITIS: I think seven is still fine. 3 MR. CHESKIS: Ten. MS. ARMSTRONG: These are working days or calendar days? JUDGE COLWELL: Calendar days. 7 MS. BENEDEK: Did you say ten? JUDGE COLWELL: Yes. 8 9 Any other discovery concerns? 10 (No response.) 11 JUDGE COLWELL: So we covered service. have a schedule. We have discovery. The only other thing is I need to tell you all that your witnesses and everything you give me should be extremely detailed and simple. I do 15 have not a solid understanding of telecom as a whole. Nothing is too simple to be put in writing. Keep that in mind. And Newton's Telecom Dictionary is what I use. 17 if you're using a term, look in there and see what it says 18 and make sure you understand that that's what I understand that term to be. 20 MS. ARMSTRONG: Can we go off the record? 21 JUDGE COLWELL: Sure. 22 (Whereupon, a brief discussion was 23 held off the record.) 24

JUDGE COLWELL: All right then.

Did we cover

everything?

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2 (No response.) 3 JUDGE COLWELL: All right. The reason we are here today making these decisions instead as of making them two months ago is because I was told the parties needed time to discuss things and work on settlement. How did that go? 7 MS. ARMSTRONG: We can discuss that off the 8 record. 9 (Whereupon, a discussion was held 10 off the record.) 11 JUDGE COLWELL: Are there any other matters 12 that I need to address while we're here on the record? 13 (No response.) 14 JUDGE COLWELL: We're all ready to go back in the office and start preparing testimony. Excellent. 16 Thank you very much for your participation today, for all the information you've given me, for your 17 arguments on the motion. You will hear from me in writing, 18 both a scheduling order will come out and an order which 19 deals with the motion that was argued. 20 If there's nothing else, we're off the 21 22 record. (Whereupon, at 2:47 p.m., the 23

hearing was adjourned.)

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify, as the stenographic reporter, that the foregoing proceedings were taken stenographically by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me, or under my direction, and that this transcript is a true and accurate record to the best of my ability.

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